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Introduction
The discourse on shale gas in the Polish media actually began in early 2010 
(the first two mentions were recorded in late 2009], and held a large amount 
of the media’s attention until the end of 2014.1 The context of the subject's 
emergence and development in the media discourse is multifaceted, shaped 
especially by economic, political and geopolitical factors, but also by historical 
ones, including those associated with Poland’s economic history, and cultural 
determinants -  the sense of national identity, relations with Russia and the 
United States, but also with the earth and nature, with the traditions shaping 
the relationship with fossil fuels, ways of thinking about the environment, etc.
Debates on shale gas continued apace at a similar time outside of Poland 
too. In Germany and the United Kingdom, their scope is national, accompa­
nied by numerous references to the countries’ energy policies. A generalised 
picture of the global discourse based on the media representations of the 
debates in these countries, as well as the USA and France, therefore seems 
relevant. Although they are outside the field of interest of many consumers, 
they serve as a point of reference for the framers of the discourses in the 
Polish media: politicians, journalists, business leaders and experts. These 
foreign discourses construct and reproduce both the success story of sorts 
observed in the USA, and the controversies on hydraulic fracturing (fracking) 
technologies there and in Europe. Interesting analyses have been conducted
1 At the tim e o f w riting, in 2 0 1 5 , shale gas is a p ractically  forgotten  su b je c t in th e public 
consciousness. References to the topic appear only occasionally in the media, and the policy 
statem ent given by Prim e M inister Beata Szydło on 18  November 2 0 1 5  also ignored it.
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on the public discourses in narrative topics related to energy policy in the 
United Kingdom (Cotton et al. 2014), the dynamic of the media discourse 
on this subject (Jaspal, Nerlich 2013), and attempts to reconstruct the con­
troversies caused by shale gas in the USA and in the international discourse 
(Mazur 2014).
Economic conditions
Gas does not occupy a prominent place in the energy use of Poles compared 
to other energy sources (particularly coal), at around 15% of final energy 
consumption (GUS 2015). The main consumer of gas in Poland is the in­
dustrial sector. Approx. 28%  of the gas consumed comes from domestic 
production, and the remainder is imported, largely from Russia. Poland's 
dependence on Russian gas stretches back to the 1970s and is connected 
to the export strategy employed by the Soviet Union at the time. Owing to 
the current pricing policy of the Russian company Gazprom, the cost of gas 
for Poland is higher than that for North-Western European countries, such 
as Germany
Despite its influence on Poland's relatively low energy dependence level, 
the domination of coal in the country's energy sector proves to be an eco­
nomic risk factor owing to the higher costs of energy obtained in this way 
(as a result of the stipulations of the EU Emission Trading System, in force 
since 2013). The low degree of diversification of suppliers of coal, gas and 
oil also creates an additional area of risk: Poland is among the countries 
with the lowest diversity of energy mix in the EU, although its energy policy 
undertakes to increase this diversity (EE 2013345).
Poland also continues to have high CO2 emissions, albeit decreasing stead­
ily since 1998. A concentration on domestic natural gas, regarded as a source 
of low emissions, is therefore a potential strategy for minimising risks. As 
mentioned above, Polish energy policy undertakes to diversify the sources 
of energy acquisition by introducing nuclear energy and increasing the pro­
portion of RES by 2030.
A significant aspect of the discourse on shale gas is the rival econom­
ic interests of entities representing various sectors of the energy indus­
try: coal, producers and operators of nuclear reactors and RES infra­
structure. The transformations of energy systems can result in threats to 
some interests and an opportunity for others, consequently enforcing a 
reconfiguration of the dominant players and verification of their action 
strategies.
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Economic conditions are also affected by the appearance on the Polish 
market of foreign companies themselves owning concessions, or acting as 
partners of companies with concessions, to search for shale gas in Poland. 
A large proportion of these companies withdrew between 2013 and 2015.
Geopolitical conditions
The security of gas supplies to European countries gains significance in the 
light of the conflict in Ukraine (a transit country for supplies of Russian gas 
to Poland) as well as Polish-Russian relations. Despite Poland's aforemen­
tioned low energy dependence compared to other EU countries -  around 
30%  -  this dependence is mainly on Russia. It will be reduced if, as forecast, 
the proportion of gas in the Polish energy mix increases, making use of do­
mestic gas resources. The prospect of acquisition of unconventional gas is 
therefore perceived as an opportunity for reduced dependence on Russian 
raw materials.
The potential exploitation of shale gas would mean closer cooperation 
with the USA, exchange of experiences, and perhaps also import of technol­
ogies and knowhow. This would result in a weakening of Russia's geopo­
litical position in the region by undermining Gazprom's economic power. 
The hoped-for strengthening of Poland’s geopolitical position as a potential 
exporter of shale gas is reflected in the future-oriented and wishful tone the 
country's politicians use in their statements. The factors of economic risk 
mentioned above can therefore be interpreted in terms of Poland's energy 
security and independence, opening a path to giving them a status of raison 
d’état.
The political debate on exploring for and exploitation of shale gas taking 
place in European Union institutions is also related to the strategic inter­
ests of individual countries -  Germany, France, the United Kingdom -  and 
the political balance of power in both the countries themselves and the 
European Parliament. This context influences the media discourses of the 
individual member states. The main dimensions of the overlapping geopo­
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F ig u re  1. Outline of geopolitical and economic references 
S o u r c e :  own elaboration.
Political conditions
The political balance of power provides a significant reference point for 
the analysed media discourse on shale gas mostly because of the model of 
the public sphere in Poland, which we assume to be close to the model of a 
representative liberal democracy (Ferree et al. 2002). As an ideal type, this 
model is based on the principles of representativeness, transparency and 
proportionality. It is based on rational discourse with a privileged position 
for symbolic elites. We can therefore assume that it is the representatives of 
these elites -  politicians, experts and journalists -  who will be most visible 
and permitted to speak most often in the public sphere. In accordance with 
the principle of proportionality in the media discourse, the largest political 
parties and NGOs will also be represented in the media discourse. We can 
therefore expect the media discourse sphere to become one set aside for 
presenting positions on shale gas, making and justifying proposals, and ex­
plaining decisions to consumers in a rational manner based on respect for 
opposing points of view.
In the period of analysis, the political scene was generally divided between 
the two largest parties -  Civic Platform (PO), centrist, defining itself as liberal, 
in power between 2007 and autumn 2015, and the conservative Law and 
Justice (PiS) party, in opposition throughout this time. In the initial phase, i.e. 
2010, both parties expressed enthusiastic support for the shale gas project, 
viewing it as offering economic and geopolitical opportunities for Poland. The 
opposition became increasingly vocal in its criticism, but this concerned the
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government's sluggishness in executing the project rather than disapproval 
of its premises. The other parties -  the Polish People's Party, representing 
above all farmers, and the Democratic Left Alliance -  did not take up a posi­
tion opposing utilisation of shale gas in Poland. They neither introduced the 
concerns voiced by environmental organisations to the media discourse nor 
supported the protests of the population living in the areas where exploration 
was taking place, although individual politicians did speak out against the 
heavy-handed policies of corporations towards local communities and the 
failure to abide by the principles of social dialogue.
The parliamentary elections of 2011 led to frequent references of politi­
cians to shale gas concerning energy security and economic development. 
Visions of the future emphasising the potential benefits figure among political 
parties' propaganda statements, with the optimistic visions of a prosper­
ous future that go with them helping to secure political capital. After the 
2011 elections, Prime Minister Donald Tusk included the subject of shale 
gas in his policy statement, while the Supreme Audit Office (NIK) report 
naming the errors and oversights in the legislative processes and adminis­
tration of the shale gas project and the withdrawal of the largest companies 
from explorations for gas in Poland meant that the issue lost its political 
attractiveness.
The next dimension of the political context is questions of legislation. 
Both the exploration and extraction of shale gas in Poland take place on 
the basis of concessions awarded by the Ministry of the Environment. On
I  September 2015 there were 40 active concessions, issued to ten Polish 
and foreign licence-holders (Ministry of the Environment data), on 70 
appraisal wells.
The explorations and potential exploitation were initially regulated by 
the Geology and Mining Law of 4 February 1994, amended by the Geology 
and Mining Law of 9 June 2011 (GML2011), and then adjusted by the Act of
I I  July 2014 on a change to the Geology and Mining Law and several other 
laws. The form of the legal solutions foreseen in GML2011 is affected by EU 
legislation in areas associated with awarding concessions for exploring for 
hydrocarbons as well as environmental protection. Fiscal issues are also 
governed by the Act of 25 July 2014 on a special hydrocarbon tax.
The previous lack of detailed regulations, as well as the work required 
to prepare and then announce them, are an important aspect of the con­
text of the public sphere, related to the media discourse forming around 
shale gas.
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Media discourses in the USA 
and European countries
The media discourses that have developed in other countries are not self-con­
tained, but, like the Polish one, entrenched in the social, political and cultural 
conditions of their own systems of reference. Their peculiar materialisations 
in the form of a set of media statements, mutual references, repetitions, 
omissions and interpretations constitute an intertextual external context, 
a space in which the symbols, iconic representations, metaphors and labels 
that affect communication in the Polish media are formed -  even though it is 
sometimes hard to recognise direct allusions to them. In the age of globalisa­
tion, the internet and social media, these contents are widely accessible, and 
can both be a point of reference to the discourses of specific groups and find 
their reflection, often somewhat transformed, in the public sphere.
For obvious reasons, it would be difficult to describe the extent and com­
plexity of this discursive sphere at length. From the point of view of analysis 
of the Polish shale gas discourse, however, two of its dimensions stand out: 
first, the discourse creating an optimistic vision of the spectacular economic 
success of shale gas extraction in the USA, and second, the area constructing 
and reproducing controversies on tracking technologies present in the USA and 
other European countries. These controversies are expressed in the form of 
various narrative strategies by diverse groups of actors and actants which form 
something like dispersed epistemic communities that can be studied through 
the discourses revealing the resources of knowledge and power rooted in the 
language, as well as contexts and organisational structures (Cotton et al. 2014).
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It is important to note that the areas divided in this way are not inter­
nally uniform, and are constructed by diverse sources using various log­
ic and semantics and with different objectives. These vary from expert, 
technological, environmental and economic discourses to political ones, 
and even the products of popular culture. Among the latter are John Fox's 
renowned film Gasland, which is critical of shale gas extraction, illustrat­
ing the social consequences of extracting unconventional hydrocarbons in 
the USA, and a production that is something of a response to it, FrackNa­
tion, directed by Magdalena Segieda, Phelim McAleer and Ann McElhinney. 
In the discourses on public policies these slot into argumentative coali­
tions and oppositions, which can be positioned on discursive maps of the 
public sphere.
The main axis of division in international discourses runs between the 
proponents of shale gas, who underline its beneficial impact on the economy 
and/or climate policy (low emissions), and its opponents, who highlight pol­
lution of groundwater, methane emission, increased risk of seismic activity, 
and contamination of land. A major part in the controversies is played by 
areas of uncertainty and ignorance concerning fracking, as well as disagree­
ment on its role in energy transformation. The depictions of shale gas in 
the narratives vary from the view of it as an ideal technology, via those that 
regard it as a transition on the road to “clean” energy, to the conviction that 
shale gas technologies block the development of alternative energy forms, 
profoundly contradicting the idea of energy transformation and sustaining 
the order based on fossil fuels.
Allan Mazur analyses the role of the media in creating these controversies 
in his article “How Did the Fracking Controversy Emerge in the Period 2010­
2012,” noting the major role played by the media in forming perceptions of a 
given technology and its consequences for political decisions (Mazur 2014). 
The sensitivity of policy makers to questions of social approval therefore 
additionally increases the economic risk involved in investments, which is of­
ten the key (and even only) reason for investors to engage in social dialogue. 
Research on the media discourse regarding shale gas demonstrates the im­
portant role played by these investors in shaping the social representatives of 
this source of energy and the associated technology (cf. Jaspal, Nerlich 2013; 
Jaspal et al. 2014) and the roles and significance of media discourse for the 
prospects of social dialogue and transformation of energy policy (Upham et 
al. 2015; Wagner 2014; Wagner et al. 2016).
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The dynamic of the Polish shale gas discourse
Shale gas appeared as a topic in the Polish media discourse in late 2009, 
as a result of the public announcement of estimates of Poland's shale gas 
resources made by Advance Resources International and Wood Mackenzie 
in 2009. The subject remained firmly in the media attention in subsequent 
years, featuring prominently in the public discourse on energy issues. Apart 
from nuclear energy questions, it has been the most frequently tackled energy 
topic in recent years. The largest increase in contents published on shale gas 
issues can be observed in 2011.
The dynamic of this discourse is connected to the political and economic 
activity of its leading actors. The initially optimistic approach that accom­
panied the exploration phase slowly gave way to slightly more critical ap­
praisal, largely as a result of the succession of companies withdrawing from 
Poland. The media discourse in 2010-2011  was characterised by optimism 
regarding shale gas, and politicians' pre-election activity was conducive to 
building optimistic visions of the future. Shale gas was mostly described in 
terms of opportunities and possibilities, which corresponded with political 
decision makers' outlook on the shale gas project (Johnson, Boersma 2013). 
These observations on the media discourse from this period are also corrob­
orated by the interim research of press discourse conducted independently 
by various researchers (e.g. Jaspal et al. 2014; Wagner 2014). The initial 
enthusiasm was followed by a period of confrontation with the realities of 
operational explorations. Criticism mounted regarding the government’s 
actions, and especially the incompetence of officials and the slow legislative 
process. A significant event in this phase of development of the discourse 
came in January 2014, with the publication of the NIK report criticising the 
actions of businesses and the administration concerning exploration for 
shale gas in Poland. The tone and character of the media discourse was also 
affected by further reports of withdrawal of significant market players from 
the project of shale gas extraction in Poland. In March 2014 the media also 
showed interest, when the government enacted the law regulating extraction 
of shale gas.
This period can be defined as a wave of moderate criticism compared to 
the previously aroused hopes, then disappointment, and finally a decline in 
interest in shale gas in the Polish media, temporarily revived by the polit­
ical event of the passing of the law. Essentially, however, in this period the 
popularity of shale gas gave way to the topic of the construction of a nuclear 
power station. The most significant events in the shale gas media discourse 
can be illustrated in the form of a timeline (see Figure 3).
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F igu re  3. Communicative events in the media determining the dynamic of the shale gas 
discourse until 2014 
S o u r c e :  own elaboration.
In the next phases of development of the discourse we can observe dy­
namic changes to particular aspects of the situation -  communications of the 
actors in the discourse, mobilised resources, argumentative strategies and 
the resultant discursive constructions.
Shale gas as a discursive construct
The issue of shale gas has been accompanied by a degree of ambivalence from 
the outset: on the one hand, it is mostly described as a resource, and as such 
as anchored in social knowledge by the following concepts: deposit, asset, 
resource, land, nature, and even treasure. In this context, even when it is ex­
ploitation that is being discussed, it does not command attention itself, but
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rather is treated instrumentally, from the perspective of optimisation of the 
extraction process. This optimisation is understood economically, in terms 
of profitability, gain, and economic risk. However, this way of speaking about 
shale gas places a strong emphasis on links to national identity, and patriot­
ism in the context of energy independence from Russia. Rusi Jaspal, Brigitte 
Nerlich and Szczepan Lemanczyk (2014) explain this way of constructing 
the social representation of shale gas by referring to the construction of 
identity vis-à-vis the Other (here Russia), perceived as a threat. The crisis in 
Ukraine only focuses this perception of Russia even more sharply. Extraction 
of shale gas becomes a chance for independence, something which gains the 
status of raison d'état in light of Poland's strained relations with Moscow. 
This opens the field of construction of social representation of shale gas 
with reference to the level of macropolitics and macroeconomics. Questions 
of social support and residents'/citizens' perception of the issues are only 
reflected in an aggregate form, as the results of surveys probing the level 
of declared support for realisation of shale gas projects in Poland. Reports 
of social protests (e.g. the case of Zurawlow2) are presented solely as local 
issues concerning a small number of residents, although with this comes a 
narrative constructed around the figures of a strong, evil corporation and 
the heroic civic resistance from those who are far weaker, but acting for 
a good cause.
The second type of discussion on shale gas emphasises not so much the 
resources as the technologies used for extracting them. This discourse cov­
ers hydraulic fracking, and is characterised by greater controversy: from 
arguments that it is harmless, and even beneficial to the objectives of climate 
policy, to harsh criticism of fracking as an untested technology with poten­
tial harmful effects for the environment and human health. The latter topic, 
developed by environmental organisations, is considerably less visible in 
the media, however.
The three areas indicated by the keywords with the highest frequency 
in the analysed discourse -  nature, economy, politics -  therefore result in 
various semantic constructions: shale gas as a resource, an asset, a treasure 
(here there is a clear predominance of positive connotations: opportunity, 
asset, hope), as well as perceived through the lens of fracking. The latter 
representation is not unequivocally positive, but rather more clearly linked 
to areas of uncertainty and risk, often described as controversial, although 
the controversies themselves are seldom articulated in the media discourse.
Although for years the main subject connected to shale gas has been its 
extraction -  the prospects for profitable exploitation and distribution, the
2 Zurawlow is a village in Lublin Voivodeship w hich becam e the site of a p ro test o f residents 
lasting m ore than a year against Chevron and its plans to search for and utilise shale gas in 
the area.
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F ig u re  4. Nonhuman factors shaping the discursive representations of shale gas 
S o u r c e :  own elaboration.
associated barriers, regulations etc. -  it is the first way of discussing the 
topic that has been the dominant one. The media frequently describe shale 
gas as being a controversial issue, but these controversies are not reflected 
in the mainstream media: either in the opinion polls they cite, in which Poles 
declare almost unanimous support for the shale gas project, or in their own 
standpoints. The “controversial” label is in fact perhaps more of a reflection of 
the discourses taking place abroad, which raise the issue of the harmfulness 
of hydraulic fracturing and the new, untested technology, and are character­
ised by a much more diverse spectrum of viewpoints.
To sum up, shale gas in Poland is for the most part discussed in terms 
rather of valuable resources than of the extraction technology (fracking). 
The main participants in the discourse are politicians and economic ex­
perts, referring to the macro level -  geopolitics and the state economy. The 
construction of the law that they employ treats it as a resource making it 
possible to realise the (economic, political) actions of the system. The in­
tensifying criticism of the state administration in the second phase of the 
discourse concerns the slow pace of legislative actions from the point of view 
of economic entities, and the complex procedures that hinder enterprises in 
realisation of their investments. As a result, the law figures in the discourse 
less often as a guarantee of justice (including fair use of natural resources) 
and protection of people in relatively weaker social positions, instead being 
treated instrumentally as a tool for realising specific interests -  in this case 
as a barrier to commencing exploration and extraction processes. Politicians 
respond to this criticism by announcing acceleration of the legislative pro­
cess and simplification of procedures, to act as an incentive for investors. 
In this context, discussions of potential protection of the environment or of 
the interests of the local population are much rarer. The concept of justice 
as objectivity that lies at the foundation of deliberation, and in particular 
the principle of protection of the positions of the weakest groups in a social 
order, is acutely marginalised here.
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Language
The actors featuring in the discourse generally have a positive view of the 
question of exploitation of gas. In the first phase, this is the dominant tone 
of the media representations, which position these topics as a big issue, 
a matter of prime importance. The language used in the press also expresses 
this -  Poland is often called a "gas Eldorado,” and the exploration for shale 
gas a "valuable, one-off opportunity,” "which might not happen again,” "the 
greatest hope for Polish energy.” Shale gas is also "excellent business,” the 
"most important subject,” something that "will become the driving force of 
our economy.” The experiences of other countries are often cited by way of 
comparison, especially the USA and Norway, which made large economic 
gains after the discovery of energy raw materials. Description of the recent 
past therefore becomes the foundation for building a vision of the future:
Although the Ernst&Young report concerns the past, it also draws conclusions on 
the future. The main one is that, following the American example, more countries 
with shale gas deposits will seek to increase extraction, becoming independent from 
external supplies. Countries equipped with the most unconventional deposits could 
be especially active in this respect. (Rzeczpospolita, 17 December 2012)
The positive image of shale gas is also affected by the idea that it is profita­
ble ("it will be possible to earn good money from shale gas”), but in particular 
by the perception of it in the context of energy independence from Russia. 
Sceptical voices tend to express caution, pointing not so much to the dangers 
as to the areas of risk resulting from failure of the enterprise (insufficient 
resources, impossibility of exploitation). No direct proponent-opponent 
conflict line concerning shale gas exploitation in Poland is evident. In sym­
bolic terms, then, shale gas is associated with the chance for independence 
from Russia and freedom ("freedom smells of gas,” Rzeczpospolita, 25 July 
2012). As time goes on, the statements become more direct, especially in 
the context of the Ukraine crisis: "The conflict between Ukraine and Russia 
has demonstrated irrefutably that Poland must become energy-independent 
from gas supplies from the East. Shale gas deposits are what give the chance 
to do so” (Dziennik Bałtycki, 12 March 2014).
In the process of construction of the media representation of shale gas, 
allusions to the myth of the gold rush (or "gold fever,” as it is called in Polish) 
also play a significant role. The symbolism that follows this not only places 
hopes and enthusiasm in the semantic field of shale gas, but also reinforces 
the positive perception of the resource as something valuable and unique 
("shale gas fever,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 24 March 2012; "Poland the second 
Norway,” Polityka, 18 January 2012).
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In the following years, despite the decline in general enthusiasm and 
criticism of the government's actions, the positive perception of shale gas 
persisted:
"I think that our natural resources can be an even stronger stimulus for development 
of the country, and I believe that acceleration, which is most important for me, of 
extraction of unconventional gas from shale is what is, and will be, the priority for 
me," Grabowski declared. (Polish Radio 1, 20 November 2013)
The increasing criticism concerning actions involving the shale gas extrac­
tion project, as opposed to be extraction itself, treated the circumstances as 
a reason for concern.
Since the beginning of the year, further blows have rained down on the Polish shale gas 
exploration programme. The NIK report presented last week is scathing, pointing to 
officials' incompetence, the danger of corruption and the lack of legal basis. The latest 
foreign investor, ENI, has begun to withdraw from Poland, having lost two (of its three) 
concessions for shale gas exploration. On top of this worrying news comes the alar­
mingly low number of shale gas exploration wells. (Dziennik Polski, 16 January 2014)
The shale gas discourse is future-oriented -  the future presented usually 
takes the forms of:
• Planned actions
• Estimates concerning resources, prices, potential inflow of extracted 
gas onto the energy markets
• Far-reaching visions of development of Poland and the geopolitical 
situation.
The statements take the form of forecasts running to the near (from a year 
to one or two decades) or, less often, more distant future (several decades or 
centuries). The former are dominant, with precise times given, e.g.:
The breakthrough will take place in 2016, when the USA and Canada will commence 
exporting LNG on a large scale, according to Sbierbank. (Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 May 
2012)
"The investments in energy begun now will in 2020 lead to a situation in which Poland 
could have an excess of its own energy," said Treasury Minister Mikołaj Budzanowski 
recently. (Rzeczpospolita, 31 October 2012)
The visions of the future presented above also vary in their modality (in­
dicating the speaker’s degree of certainty that the forecast would come true). 
Some sentences appear that affirm the assumed state of affairs:
Gas will come from shale in 2014. (Rzeczpospolita, 27 March 2012)
The first wells for exploring for shale gas in Poland have been made. Prime Minister 
Tusk predicts a real abundance. (Polityka, 1 June 2011)
Or in a somewhat less categorical form:
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[...] there is much to suggest that 2013 will be a breakthrough year -  in every mea­
sure: global, European, Polish, financial, social and geopolitical. (Rzeczpospolita, 
29 December 2012)
There will also probably be a breakthrough in the energy market. In 2013 development 
of shale gas will be accelerated on a global scale, and this new trend might change 
the global balance of power within a decade. (Rzeczpospolita, 29 December 2012)
Some sentences refer to the future actions planned at present:
By the end of the year, exploratory work is due to be completed or to start at 29 sites. 
(Rzeczpospolita, 6 August 2012)
Others can be classified as wishful thinking. The visions of the future they 
present, based on estimated data, encompass a time frame even of several 
centuries, for example:
300 years -  this is how long shale gas resources in Poland are estimated to last. 
(Rzeczpospolita, 10 October 2011)
The scenarios that are presented are conditional, dependent above all 
on discovery of shale gas in Poland and confirmation of the profitability of 
its extraction. These two fundamental conditions delineate the main areas 
of risk conceptualised in the press discourse. Yet both can essentially only 
be verified by practical action. There is therefore a need to act, and permit 
exploration and exploitation attempts, in order to assess their effectiveness. 
The potential negative effects of these actions are not discussed.
Social worlds and arenas
Krzysztof Konecki (2010), following the ideas of Paul G. Cressey, describes 
“social worlds” from the point of view of the actions around which these 
worlds are formed. They arrange a physical and symbolic space for them­
selves, and within them norms develop, subjected to action, as well as 
a particular division of work. The main action is accompanied by auxiliary 
ones. In public communication, social worlds will therefore be a reflec­
tion and measure of socially existing worlds, while the media discourse 
space will become an additional measure of their creation and reproduction. 
We will henceforth understand arenas as scenes constructed in media state­
ments, in which events are presented and actors operate. They are a space 
of the conflict going on within the social world, and can be the nucleus of 
creation of a new sub-discourse (Konecki 2010). They become part of the 
perspective of a specific area of social life (e.g. politics, economics, science,
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and, in the case of lifeworld, work, family, recreation, habits and individual 
likes) that is dominant in a given extract.
In keeping with the trends anticipated by the presence of collective and 
individual actors, the world of economics and politics are dominant. Also 
present, but with less exposure, is the world based on the perspective of 
environmental protection, as well as the marginal lifeworld, incorporating 
the perspective of “everyday life,” of so-called ordinary people.
The dominant meanings of the world of economics are subordinated to 
the perspective of profit, expressed in terms of making money, costs, prices, 
the market etc. The world of the market and economics is complemented by 
a variously characterised economic-political perspective. In the latter case, 
the perspective of profit is linked with an orientation towards reproduction 
of power. Costs, supply and demand therefore become tools or effects of 
political actions. The two first perspectives encompass the entire spectrum 
of systemic presentation of shale gas -  on the one hand in the light of the 
potential gains, investments and necessary expenditure, and on the other 
in the context of independence from other states (mostly Russia), possible 
alliances and cooperation (mostly with the USA) and strengthened position 
in the political balance of power in the domestic (parliamentary elections) 
and international arena (within the EU). This world also has a political-ad­
ministrative dimension, being subject to the principle of efficient organisa­
tion of systemic actions, and thus legal regulations, administrative control 
and ensuring security. This is the world of the state. The separate world 
of environmentalists, whose horizon is marked by an orientation towards 
environmentally friendly activities, including preserving natural resources 
where possible in an untouched state for future generations, is weakly rep­
resented in the media discourse. Yet it is not an invisible or unnamed world. 
It is named, not by its own representatives, but by politicians, business 
representatives and journalists in external roles, who speak of the efforts, 
actions and logic of “ecologists.” We therefore find slivers of this world in the 
media discourse, but they seldom set the dominant atmosphere of the text 
or programme, instead appearing as additional arguments accompanying 
other perspectives.
The main arena in which various ways of interpreting shale gas can meet 
is the battlefield of economic and political interests. The latter involve repro­
duction of power through controlling the situation, including strategic goods. 
Elements of the environmental discourse, focused on protection of nature, 
intergenerational solidarity and the perspective of sustainable development, 
occupy marginal places here, and are non-existent in the main, central part. 
This has consequences for the nature of the conflicts that are played out, 
which do not include the dispute over the safety of fracking technologies 
for the environment. Something that we can observe is the efforts made by
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actors of the environmental world to enter the economic and political arena 
-  in both cases without significant results. For example, the representatives 
of environmental organisations emphasised the financial expenditure asso­
ciated with the realisation of the shale gas project as a factor hindering the 
development of RES (lack of funds to subsidise this sector), and Greenpeace 
launched an offensive timed to coincide with the UN climate summit in War­
saw. This is an important narrative, however, as it directly concerns questions 
of energy policy and of setting its priorities, as well as -  although this is not 
articulated directly -  certain moral assumptions of which sources of energy 
are good. This strategy is based on the metaphorical opposition of "dirty” 
and "clean” energy sources noted in external discourses (Cotton et al. 2014). 
Yet the media do not give much attention to the issues highlighted within 
this, such as the pollution of water and methane emissions, and the media 
discourse fails to develop them. The actors of worlds marginalised in the 
discourse therefore endeavour to increase their visibility in the public sphere, 
not always successfully. The main problem is doing battle in the economic 
arena, in which a unique weaponry applies: vocabulary associated with profit, 
money, growth and economic development. In the material we analysed, we 
found no attempts to introduce a new semantics based on alternative lexica.
The world of extraction technologies, engineers and geologists is also only 
lightly sketched, and not clearly articulated in the mainstream media. The key 
actions for this world appear as key words, as the problems or possibilities of 
extraction. Its actors, symbolic determinants and resources are seldom cited 
in the discourse, and do not form their own symbolic space. The lifeworlds 
of the residents of potential sites for exploration, or the world of the every­
day lives of inhabitants of Poland in general, in which individuals' beliefs, 
approaches and emotions would find their place, is an unknown space. The 
residents or local communities cited in the discourse tend to be treated as 
passive addressees of actions rather than active agents. The few statements 
that refer to social protests provide us with a partial, one-dimensional picture 
of this world. These are essentially solitary islands in a sea of opinion polls 
expressing aggregative support for shale gas investments. The perspective of 
the everyday, norms and values with a bearing on the perception of energy 
issues is in fact non-existent in the press we analysed. Topics problematising 
the industrialisation of rural areas (as a consequence of shale gas extraction) 
also do not appear, and the narrative observed in the United Kingdom, of the 
uneven distribution of risk and the expected benefits, appears marginally in 
the form of a story about a gargantuan, avaricious corporation and desperate, 
weaker farmers, in the few materials that describe the conflict between the 
residents of Zurawlów and Chevron.
Both the lifeworld and the world of technology are characterised by cer­
tain processes that serve to develop the technologies or perspectives of
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residents through hegemonic worlds -  that of economics and politics. This 
phenomenon can be described using the concept of colonialisation of the 
lifeworld, in a sense also the world of technology, as a world of practical 
possibilities, by power and money, i.e. the aforementioned hegemonic worlds 
of the state and economy.
Actors
Our analysis methodology distinguished socially individual actors (people) 
and collective ones (organisations, groups), as well as primary and back­
ground actors. Primary actors are those who play active roles in the dis­
course, are quoted (press, internet) or directly presented (radio, TV), have 
the chance to state their views independently, take a standpoint, and make 
independent use of symbolic resources. Background actors, on the other 
hand, are those cited by others, appearing in absentia, so to speak. Positions 
and resources are attributed to them, as they become a point of reference 
for other contributors. Background actors sometimes speak independently 
-  their statements are presented -  but these appearances serve to illustrate 
information (e.g. shots showing protesting members of local communities).
In a quantitative sense, collective actors dominate individual actors. 
Though there are more of them, however, they are usually background fig­
ures. Economic organisations predominate here: companies and enterprises, 
including Polish -  PGNIG, Tauron, Energa -  and foreign ones -  Gazprom, 
Areva, Chevron. Alongside them we observe such institutions as the stock ex­
change, banks, and financial and energy markets. As for the major individual 
actors, these are domestic politicians -  initially, Prime Minister Donald Tusk 
was very active, joined increasingly by the ministers of the economy and -  
after the change in this position in 2013 -  the minister of the environment.
The main background actors to join these domestic politicians are other 
countries, whose leaders are mentioned as synonymous terms for state 
organisms (Poland, but also Merkel, Putin, Obama, Germany, Russia, USA). 
The media visibility of scientific and research institutes is insignificant. They 
neither publish their own views on the shale gas project, nor give their verdict 
on expert opinions or reports that appear, with the exception of the first esti­
mates concerning resources of Polish deposits. The Polish Geological Institute 
(PGI) and the Energy Information Agency (EIA) both figure in the discourse, 
but much less frequently than the aforementioned economic institutions. 
Experts are an important category of actors, as they prove to be active. Expert 
status is defined either explicitly, where a journalist presents the individu-
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al’s role as such, or by reference to the specialist knowledge. Experts in the 
shale gas discourse are mostly actors of the world of economics, and usually 
employees of consulting companies, businesses and think tanks or business 
analysts, rather than engineers or geologists working in R&D departments. 
There are a few appearances in the discourse of environmentalists or repre­
sentatives of the social sciences. Universities do not operate as a notable place 
of generation of important knowledge or as an institution legitimising the 
actions taken in the world of economics or politics. In comparison with the 
discourse concerning nuclear energy, we can observe a migration of knowl­
edge from the traditional centres of its generation (academic research and 
theoretical institutions) towards the economic system (businesses' analysis 
departments, company laboratories, consulting agencies). Hybrid institutions 
symbolically located somewhere between the system of science and those of 
economics and politics -  think tanks, science-business consortia, etc. -  are 
also being formed. This observation is consistent with Nico Stehr's (2012) 
definition of knowledge as the foundation of taking actions (as opposed to 
information, which constitutes a resource not necessarily connected to an 
actor's actions). However, economics does not seek knowledge beyond its 
own world, but rather generates and obtains it in its own scope and for its 
own use. We should note that the discursive map of energy issues has certain 
blank spaces. Above all, there is no local community, residents, and citizens 
in a broader sense. The representatives of the local community generally 
function in the roles of passive actors, addressees of actions, and constructs 
used as points of reference in the statements of politicians and experts. There 
is also a weak showing from representatives of the third sector, limited to 
selected environmental organisation and two civic institutes (Sobieski Insti­
tute, Kościuszko Institute).
From the first phase of development of the discourse, a certain order of 
dominant actors began to form, which did not change substantially in the 
subsequent period. Using the similarity map (Figure 5), we can clearly reveal 
the links between codes within one cluster. Evident here are mutual links be­
tween economic and political institutions taking an economic perspective, i.e. 
employing the criterion of profitability and the language of profits and costs. 
We see a strong connection between experts and the institutions forming 
the economic system, as well as with the state and politicians. The field of 
influence also includes the media with weak links to the first sector, as well 
as slightly more distant political institutions and informal groups (and then 
residents and the local community).
The press analyses we conducted demonstrate minimal differences be­
tween the various publications when it comes to the exposure of the individ­
ual categories of actors. Three categories are dominant: politicians, experts 
and representatives of business.
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other actors
F ig u re  5. Links between codes in the discourse 2009 -2012  
S o u r c e :  own elaboration.
F ig u re  6. Actors and actants of the shale gas discourse 20 1 3 -2 0 1 4  
S o u r c e :  own elaboration.
In the collective actors category, there is also a lack of fundamental dif­
ferences from a synchronic (publications) and diachronic (years) point of 
view. The main categories are still states and economic institutions. Subtle 
differences can be found between the national and local media. In the latter, 
local government politicians appear somewhat more frequently.
As noted above, there are blank spaces in the reconstructed discursive 
map. Above all, there is no local community, residents, or also citizens in 
a broader sense. Where the representatives of the local community do appear,
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they generally function as passive actors, addressees of actions, constructs 
used as a point of reference in the statements of politicians and experts.
The exposure of representatives of the third sector is also relatively weak, 
confined to selected environmental organisations (Greenpeace, Green Insti­
tute] and two civic institutes (Sobieski Institute, Kościuszko Institute]. They are 
therefore unable to share their perspectives and positions in the arena, which 
means that this dimension of conflict is not articulated in the public space.
Conflicts played out in arenas
In the discursive arenas, we therefore observe a crossing of the interests 
of actors, especially political and economic ones. Experts are placed in the 
role of adherents of the conflicting sides. The conflict of interest concerning 
the economic actors representing the industry interested in exploitation of 
shale gas is mostly about distribution of the expected profits between the 
enterprise and the state -  which is expressed in the discussion of tax issues.
The subject of shale gas in the media discourse shows a clear tendency to­
wards representations using binary oppositions. The shale gas-coal opposition, 
along with the associated energy models, proves to be fundamental here. Oppo­
sitions are also invoked in the media discourse, however, in the form of negation.
The second of the strong oppositions is the representation of the EU's 
climate policy as incompatible with Poland's economic interests. The axis of 
tension between various orientations concerning energy policy -  the posi­
tion considering protection of the environment and climate, and that which 
prioritises industrial development -  runs between the European Union and 
the Polish government and the investors and experts in coalition with it. 
Owing to the weak visibility of other actors (ENGOs, scientists, social activ­
ists), it is EU climate policy that occupies the indicated counter-position. It 
is worth noting, however, that the EU position that is cited appears in terms 
of technicised legal instruments -  questions of emissions, requirements for 
obtaining environmental decisions etc. There is no discussion on its axio- 
normative foundations or strategic objectives.
The third opposition is that of Poland, as well as the EU and the West, with 
the Russian company Gazprom, which is identified with Russia’s expansive 
policy. This dimension mainly corresponds to the politicisation of the issue of 
shale gas extraction. Gazprom is perceived as the chief antagonist of shale gas, 
and the relatively rarely recorded protests of environmentalists meet with 
commentary on the implicit connections with Gazprom and its stimulation 
of adverse presentation of shale gas.
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An opposing voice observed in the discourse is Gasland. The occasional 
comments of the local community refer to the film, and experts and business 
representatives also assume a position towards it, disavowing the image it 
presents of the negative environmental effects of shale gas.
The conflicts outlined are played out within the arenas of the economic, 
political and social worlds. Each defines the roles separately, as well as equip­
ping their actors with slightly different symbolic resources.
Among the main conflicts is that between Gazprom and the allied forces of 
Polish and American companies. At stake is Russian domination on the Euro­
pean market, with the conflict going beyond a strictly economic dimension to 
touch upon geopolitical spheres of influence. Gazprom assumes the form of a 
negative protagonist endangering other participants of the energy markets. 
This demonic image of Gazprom is also referred to by those who question it:
This is the most fantastical part of the myth, but it is so attractive that it has already 
inspired sensational novels. The cover of Zbigniew Machowski’s Greed is Good, the 
first shale-gas novel, features the question, "Will Russia seize Polish gas deposits?”. 
(Polityka, 18 January 2012)
The conflict between Gazprom, represented by Russia, and the Western 
world, is also played out in a strictly political dimension:
The final victory of the Russian authorities will take place if we do not reach agreement 
on shale gas in Poland. (Rzeczpospolita, 26 November 2012)
It is often accompanied by military metaphors:
The agreement on shale gas does not mean that we will win the battle for exploita­
tion of this raw material (the opposition, meaning the Russians and the Western 
renewable energy lobby, are still strong and will not give up). (Rzeczpospolita, 
27 September 2011)
The Russians’ irritation was triggered by the assault of American concerns seeking 
shale gas in Poland, which Gazprom treats as its own sphere of influence. (Gazeta 
Wyborcza, 14 June 2010)
This year's Wrocław Global Forum, which took place on 9-11  June, was largely devoted 
to questions of freedom and democracy, as well as energy and raw materials. Although 
this seems like a backbreaking combination, it is unsurprising given the consistency 
with which the Kremlin uses gas and oil to manipulate its upstart neighbours and the 
huge scale on which China is exploring Africa and South America to search for strategic 
raw material deposits. (Wprost, 20 June 2011)
The political conflict is also played out on the EU scene, between the 
proponents and opponents of shale gas exploitation.
France does not agree to shale gas exploitation and is in favour of its prohibition in 
the whole European Union. This is contradictory to Polish interests. (Rzeczpospolita, 
16 November 2012)
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A simultaneous juxtaposition is "coal versus shale gas” or "nuclear versus 
shale gas.” Here, the various energy technologies are treated as alternative, 
and therefore rivals.
Will nuclear energy not tolerate shale gas in Poland? (Gazeta Wyborcza, 16 October 
2012)
The problem is that we do not have enough money to build a nuclear power station and 
search for shale gas using technology we do not yet possess and in which the Minister 
of the Treasury told state companies to invest. (Rzeczpospolita, 31 October 2012)
Less confrontational voices also appear in the discourse, calling for diver­
sification of the technologies employed. These, however, are often articulated 
as wishful thinking, alongside the discussed presentation, which is clearly 
present and contained implicitly in the press articles.
I believe that the wealth of Pomerania will be based on energy and raw materials. It is 
not just shale gas and nuclear energy. (Gazeta Wyborcza, 5 November 2011)
The social discourse is only hinted at in the discourse, without extensive 
discussion of the causes and determinants. The conflict is only noted in 
this arena, while at the same time it is played out beyond the main media 
representations.
The Kashubians versus shale gas. Protests in Pomerania against shale gas exploration. 
(Rzeczpospolita, 12 October 2012)
To an extent simultaneously with the political and economic discourse 
-  dominant in the press and on radio and television -  in the field of so­
cial media, popular culture, and also individual commentaries, conflicts are 
played out between local communities and their representatives -  activists, 
environmental organisations and farmers -  and big corporate business. The 
positions of participants in the dispute are presented as asymmetrical in 
terms of power and influences, which are shown as sources of oppression. 
The role of corporations portrayed here is decidedly negative, and their eco­
nomic interest is contrasted not so much with individual interests as with 
autotelic values: justice, human decency, and respect for nature.
In short: I prefer for a thousand Polish peasants to live in a clean environment 
than for five shareholders of an enormous corporation to change their wood on 
board their yachts to a more refined one (because these are the objectives for 
which enormous corporations usually exist). And I also don't like it when the 
big guy kicks the little guy, because how else can you describe Chevron’s lawsuit 
against 13 rather randomly selected farmers out of 150 protestors?
Although this kind of conflict seldom appears in the arenas constructed 
in the media discourse, to an extent it develops independently from the 
mainstream, mostly reaching the consumers associated with this world.
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The presentation of arguments, portrayal and reference to values brings it 
closer to the perspective of residents' everyday lives than the political and 
economic discourse, which refer to macro-problems. Moreover, it makes use 
of evocative and communicatively strong means of expression -  for exam­
ple, on YouTube one can watch numerous films illustrating burning water 
coming out of a tap (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4LBjSXWQRV8, 
access 29 September 2014, views: 1,635,516).
Arena or agora?
In the background of the conflict axes illustrated here, so to speak, we can 
find numerous (albeit disparate) topics on cooperation. Most are proposals 
referring to economic collaboration, but taking the political consequences 
into account. Poland’s main partner identified in the analysed articles is the 
United States, followed by Canada.
"American companies have a large financial potential, and we know that explorations 
come with a certain risk. This is why such collaboration is important for PGNiG,” he 
adds. (Rzeczpospolita, 27 August 2010)
For now Orlen is funding its shale gas exploration itself. However, it is speaking to the 
companies with the experience and technology required to extract gas from shale de­
posits and who might be interested in joint projects. This is hardly surprising -  a well 
costs several million dollars, so it makes sense to share costs with companies that have 
hundreds of such wells behind them. The natural partners for such collaboration are 
companies whose concession territory borders with Orlen's, so ExxonMobil, Chevron 
and Encana, for example. (Wprost, 6 September 2010)
Geofizyka has decided to take the opportunity, and boasts the position of leader of 
the domestic search for unconventional deposits of natural gas. It is working with the 
concerns PGNiG, ExxonMobil, Chevron, ConocoPhilips and Aurelian. (Gazeta Wyborcza, 
8 December 2012)
This cooperation space, however, concerns business and administrative 
partners; there are no efforts to construct a plane of common actions for a 
larger number of stakeholders, such as local governments, state power, busi­
ness, NGOs, research centres and the local population. There is no attempted 
empowerment of citizens, by making actors from outside politics and econom­
ics additional stakeholders discussing the problem of shale gas, allowing them 
to add to the discourse the perspective of sustained development, and thus 
quality of life, health issues and protection of the environment, understood 
as a common good. The emotions incorporated in the discourse are managed 
ideologically, and these include extreme emotions: from enthusiasm and na­
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tional pride, supporting visions of successful exploitation, to fear, frustration 
and anger, from which perspective positions opposing the exploration and 
exploitation of shale deposits in Poland are perceived. We should also note here 
that it is not cognitively legitimate to attribute these negative emotions to lack 
of knowledge, as ignorance is also connected in the discourse with positions 
in support of shale gas, and actors even use it strategically (cf. Wagner 2014).
Actors in the discourse make use of various types of symbolic resources 
which they cite or attribute to other actors, constructing their positions and 
argumentative strategies. Among the main ones are resources of knowledge 
and ignorance, from which the understanding and definition of risk often 
result, but they also include the law, norms and values, and power and eco­
nomic capital possessed.
Although shale gas can be, and is, viewed in terms of technological inno­
vations (Stankiewicz 2013), and as a result one might expect the discourse to 
include attempts to construct a corpus of shared knowledge on the subject and 
a process of distribution of this knowledge featuring experts and decision 
makers, in fact the media discourse in Poland is constructed on a peculiar igno­
rance, and moreover one that in certain areas is strategic (Wagner 2014). Rather 
than extreme oppositions, knowledge and ignorance function in the discourse 
rather as ends of the same continuum. Knowledge here is defined as a process 
at the basis of the actions taken by social actors (Gross 2012). One might expect 
knowledge to give the opportunity to take these actions, and ignorance not 
(Stehr 2012). Yet this issue is complicated in the shale gas discourse. The know­
ledge continuum does not so much convey a quantitative increase -  somebody 
knows more, somebody less (or its qualitative differentiation in various social 
actors) -  as the degree of certainty of these statements. For example:
There is no certainty  that extraction of gas from shale deposits will be profitable. 
The boss of PGNiG also warns that it is premature to give any estimates or forecasts 
concerning extraction. (Rzeczpospolita, 27 July 2010)
But thanks to unconventional gas deposits, especially those in shale, that could change. 
Because according to a report of the US Energy Information Agency (EIA) published in 
April this year, the forecast resources o f  extraction o f  shale gas in Poland are 5 billion cubic 
metres, and their market value exceeds tens of billions of dollars. Except that these are 
estimates not of geologists, but only of a consulting firm. (Gazeta Wyborcza, 18 July 2011)
According to the US Energy Information Agency, resources of shale gas are also present 
in Poland, and may total 5.3 billion cubic metres, the most in Europe. For now these are 
theoretical estimates, because the explorations for shale gas are only now taking place, 
the government stresses. But PiS wants to guarantee profits from shale exploitation 
now. (Gazeta Wyborcza, 24  May 2011)
It is in fa c t  already certain that Poland, and in particular Pomerania, is "sleeping” on 
vast resources of shale gas. Suffice it to say that if it was only Poland using the gas, the 
resources would be enough for approx. 300 years. (Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 October 2011)
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The states close to the end of the continuum described as ignorance -  and 
thus supposition, estimates, lack of facts -  by no means constitute obstacles 
to taking actions. Uncertainty is treated as an intrinsic aspect of human ac­
tivity, and actors referring to the unknown at the same time describe what 
is not yet known. This is a type of ignorance which Matthias Gross (2012), 
following Georg Simmel, calls specified ignorance. In communicative actions, 
actors refer to knowledge, constructing areas of ignorance, and also attrib­
uting specific resources of knowledge and ignorance to other actors. This is 
an element of negotiation concerning which actions must or should be taken. 
Presumptions suffice to initiate them and, regardless of the later effects, 
taking actions itself triggers a change. This type of action usually becomes 
the basis of making political capital.
Even if it turns out that the scale of extraction of gas is not large, it will improve 
Poland’s situation. The investments begun now must be continued by the next go­
vernments. (Fakt, 11 June 2010)
For now these are only estimates. How much gas there really is in Polish shale will become 
clear in a few years after the explorations conducted by the biggest fuel companies in 
the USA and Western Europe. Since 2007 the Ministry of the Environment has already 
issued 85 concessions for searching for shale gas. (Gazeta Wyborcza, 18 May 2011)
It is not known how much gas there is in Polish shale and whether exploitation of 
deposits will pay. But PiS wants to inscribe in the law now a provision that the state 
budget will receive 40  percent of income from sales of gas. (Gazeta Wyborcza, 
24 May 2011)
The discourse even includes the position that these changes should be 
preceded by actions taken on the basis of incomplete/dubious knowledge, 
in order to make competition possible.
Today models are needed. The law should precede investments, and not straggle 
behind them. It is time to think about who we want to base our business model on. 
Do we want in future to earn as much on gas as the Canadians, as much as the Nor­
wegians, or perhaps as much as the Americans? The comfortable moment when we 
have hard data allowing precise calculations to be made will come only when the 
Ministry of the Environment receives the results of gas explorations conducted by 
private investors. If we were to wait till then, that would mean that only in 4 -5  years' 
time would financiers and lawyers set about writing the strategies for managing this 
good. This will potentially be a huge financial conflict. Yet it looks as if our strategists 
will be joining a game that is already underway. They will no longer be able to play 
the gambit deciding on its subsequent course. (Polityka, 1 June 2011)
In the economic discourse, the financial and political risk and the con­
structed area of uncertainty, juxtaposed with enthusiastic visions of future 
gains, opportunities and possibilities, means that the shale gas extraction 
technologies can be defined as innovations, which therefore provides a ba­
sis for favourable financial regulations (Wagner 2014). This is an example
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of strategic use of ignorance, in which the actor makes deliberate use of its 
resources in order to attain specific objectives (McGoey 2012). Understand­
ing knowledge and ignorance as lying at the foundations of human actions 
directs attention towards the concepts of risk and uncertainty (Wagner 
2014). Gross defines the differences between them as follows: risk is an 
undesirable possibility that we can foresee; uncertainty, meanwhile, is an 
undesirable possibility that cannot be foreseen at a given point (Gross 2010]. 
Estimations of risk often involve its quantification -  they not only require 
knowledge and awareness of its gaps, but when actions are taken they en­
tail readiness to expose oneself to specific threats, whereas in the case of 
uncertainty potential threats cannot be foreseen until they occur (Tannert 
et al. 2007). It is impossible to prepare for them or accept them. There are 
two types of ignorance here: closed -  when in uncertainty we reject and 
deny existing knowledge, choosing ignorance, or open -  when we perceive 
the need to know more (Tannert et al. 2007). Both types of ignorance are 
articulated in the discourse, but with differing aims. Closed ignorance is 
connected to arguments for abandoning the explorations and exploitation 
of shale. Owing to the marginalisation of this position in the discourse, this 
type of ignorance also appears relatively seldom. Open ignorance is also cited 
by proponents of shale gas -  experts in science making tentative attempts to 
cool the excessive and premature enthusiasm, economic experts stressing 
the significance and essence of the risk associated with investment in shale 
gas, and finally business representatives themselves, emphasising the high 
degree of uncertainty of the field and seeking additional support for their 
actions from the political community.
Conceptualisations of risk
The most common connotations of the concept of risk in the discourse are 
those referring to the economy. Above all, the media articulate the financial 
risk borne by investors owing to the uncertain profitability of exploitation of 
deposits, as well as the political risk associated with the unpredictability of 
political decisions made on the basis of criteria other than rational analysis 
of costs/gains. Part of this perception of risk is instability of the legal setting 
and the insufficient pace of adaptation of regulations to the new challenges 
that shale gas exploitation brings. The next dimension of economic-political 
risk is the controversies over shale gas played out in the international arena, 
and particularly in EU regulations. This is rather an area of uncertainty than 
one of risk -  in the initial phase of development of the discourse it is hard to
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predict the position of European institutions and the restrictions that they 
will impose on member states.
Therefore, although the area of the unknown concerning the profitability 
of exploitation of deposits seems to be expressed in the language of risk (i.e. 
a language of numbers giving estimates, likelihood and financial calculations], 
political factors affect the interpretations of issues of extraction in terms of 
uncertainty -  of the unpredictable political and geopolitical circumstances.
The next threat in terms of exposure is the energy dependence on another 
country, especially Russia.3 The uncertainty associated with Moscow’s unpre­
dictable international policy and the recognised risk incurred by a potential 
block on gas supplies or unfavourable purchase conditions act in the media 
space as something of a counterbalance to the marginalised actions of the 
shale gas opposition.
The question of dangers to the environment is seldom discussed, and the 
risk to human health caused by fracking more rarely still. The problem of in­
dustrialisation of rural areas does not exist in the media discourse, and where 
topics of social risk do arise, they are relatively weak, and reduced to potential 
conflicts between the investor and residents. The issue of distribution of pos­
sible risks and benefits between social actors is also not covered in the media.
References to seismic activity, water pollution or uncontrolled gas emis­
sions are lacking. Risk is perceived as directly linked to human activity. To 
a great extent this is the risk of incorrect assumptions in relation to the actual 
state (size of deposits, conditions of exploitation], as well as connected with 
the unpredictable actions of other actors (social, political risk]. Strategic deci­
sions are made with awareness of incomplete or unconfirmed (hypothetical] 
knowledge and under time pressure. Speed of action here is a condition for 
obtaining the market advantage, while scientific knowledge gained through 
research provides only estimates which must be confirmed in companies' 
operational activity. Therefore, it is only the practice that is the consequence 
of decisions that can verify their pertinence.
As mentioned above, the knowledge leading to decisions on exploration 
and exploitation of shale gas requires verification. The resources of the­
oretical knowledge are insufficient to eliminate the investment risk (also 
environmental, although this is discussed much less frequently]. This prac­
tice has now become the domain of economic entities, rather than scientific 
research institutions:
Until the companies complete the exploration, we will not know what the actual 
reserves of shale gas in Poland might be and how many of them can be exploited 
profitably. (Gazeta Wyborcza, 17 March 2011]
3 The p resen ce of Russia appears in various contexts, and it is th erefore coded in term s of 
both  conceptualisation of risk  and econom ic or political conflict.
152 Aleksandra Wagner
And let's not forget that the technology for extracting gas from shale is experimental. 
Nobody has done it yet over a longer period, so what will really happen underground 
is to a great extent still theory. (Gazeta Wyborcza, 23 March 2011]
What did the miners' representatives say? That everything is super-safe. Except that 
they don’t  have any proof. (Gazeta Wyborcza, 23 March 2011]
We can observe a significant difference concerning the perceived field of 
uncertainty between the position represented by professionals and decision 
makers and that attributed to the protesting members of the local commu­
nity. The igloo of uncertainty model developed by Tannert et al. (2007] can 
act as a basis for mapping the differences in the positions that actors in the 
discourse occupy regarding knowledge and ignorance.
The position most frequently represented by politicians -  especially 
the government and above all the prime m inister -  corresponds most 
to the position of "closed knowledge” -  "we know enough to make decisions 
on the future.” This enthusiastic position, geared towards gathering social 
support capital, does not fully match the positions held by the institutions 
from which this knowledge comes. Experts occupying positions of knowledge 
mostly concentrate on "what we do not yet know,” and less often on "what 
needs to be learnt.” They make a kind of estimate of the potential risks, which, 
as we have seen, are political and economic risks. In the technological field we 
observe what Piotr Stankiewicz (2009] has called a "strategy of declared safe­
ty” as a strategy for lessening conflict by reducing it to its market dimension.
The dominant actors in the discourse usually couch the positions assigned 
to members of the local community in terms of ignorance. On the sporadic 
occasions when local community voices are quoted (often under the influence 
of Gasland, and its criticism of shale gas extraction], the state of awareness 
present corresponds to "open ignorance,” whereby the ignorance comes with 
the strong belief that in order to make a rational decision it is necessary to 
"know more.” Only then can the perceived danger be transformed into ac­
ceptable or inevitable risk.
Law
A large proportion of social actors’ statements concern issues of legal regula­
tions. The dynamic of the legislative process is linked to that of the discourse 
in the sense that media interest is piqued by any new bill, agreement or entry 
into force of regulations and the surrounding circumstances. From the begin­
ning, the law is treated as a framework shaping the possibilities and extent 
of investors’ activities. This perspective of the relationship between the law
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and the economy is certainly at the forefront of the discourse. It is treated 
as one of the factors with an impact on the bill’s economic effectiveness. 
This is also the perspective from which the actions of ruling politicians are 
judged: on the one hand they make declarations concerning the preparation 
of regulations which will above all facilitate the actions of representatives 
of business, while on the other they are criticised for sluggishness and in­
competence. It is worth noting that economic topics are usually connected 
to issues of domestic law, whereas environmental matters tend to refer to 
EU regulations.
It is hard to find another group of actors whose perception of extrac­
tion law has comparable media exposure. In comparison to the German 
media, for example, which frequently raise the question of cautious reg­
ulations safeguarding the interests of the community and environmental 
safety, in the Polish discourse there is in fact no reference to a law protect­
ing the interests of shale gas opposition groups. On the whole, the law as 
a guarantor of citizens’ safety functions only in the form of generalised 
references.
It appears more frequently as a tool of domination, for example in the few 
descriptions of the Zurawlow protest, where the corporation’s argument that 
it is acting in accordance with binding civil law is confronted with natural 
law, the right to land and to the legacy of future generations. The law is also 
often presented as a tool of pressure from the European Union. It is referred 
to by the marginalised actors of environmental civic movements, which 
invoke it as a safeguard from the individual interests of global corporations 
and local politicians.
The dominant actors usually treat the law incorporated in the shale gas 
discourse as a tool to enable them to act in a way favourable to their inter­
ests, and essentially protecting above all those of the elites. From this point 
of view, it is viewed as "friendly” to investors or a "barrier” to realisation of 
economic interests, often identified with those of the state.
The media as a space of deliberation: 
exclusion and inclusion mechanisms
The characteristics of the shale gas discourse we have observed seem to 
fit the concept of "post-normal science” proposed by Silvio Funtowicz and 
Jerome Ravetz in 1991. This envisages situations in which facts are uncer­
tain, values debatable, the stakes high and decisions urgent (Funtowicz,
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Ravetz 1991; 1992). Despite the gaps in the available knowledge and the 
high level of uncertainty, it is necessary to make a quick decision on what to 
do. The way in which the discourse on shale gas in Poland has progressed 
seems to go beyond the field that the authors' model refers to as profession­
al consultation. The areas of risk surpass the competences of experts, the 
risk itself is unquantifiable, and the existing methods for solving problems 
prove to be inadequate (Funtowicz, Ravetz 1991: 5). The authors therefore 
propose widespread deliberation and participation of stakeholders in the 
decision-making process. We cannot find any traces of such an approach in 
the media discourse. The members of the community are treated as passive 
recipients of actions and decisions and are not properly represented in the 
discourse. Efforts to incorporate into the discussion forms that the authors 
point to as possible alternative knowledge resources -  collective wisdom, 
"real-life” examples, neighbourhood stories, secret documents or the result 
of journalistic investigations -  are extremely rare. Where do they occur, as 
with Gasland, they are denied validity, and their objectivity, rationality or in­
strumental intentions and ideological obstinacy are questioned. The media as 
broadcasters do not undertake to promote active civic deliberation, stimulate 
dialogue, or organise a space for exchange of arguments.
The question of whether the media constitute a space of deliberation 
concerning shale gas is a question of the vision of the public space that they 
pursue, to whom they provide visibility and who is lacking in this space. 
Further questions are how the mutual relations of actors present in the 
discursive worlds are arranged, which actions are presented and how they 
gain legitimation. Finally, how are actors' positions built and what strategies 
do they employ to be present in the communicative space and to make the 
meanings of their world common meanings.
The first and most obvious exclusion mechanism is omission and ab­
sence. Some social actors do not appear at all in the shale gas discourse, 
while others do very seldom. Although in the former case it is difficult to 
say whether the reasons for the lack of certain communities active in the 
media discourse of other countries (artists, religious organisations, industry 
associations, e.g. farmers) is a lack of interest or rather intentional omission, 
we can certainly observe large disproportions between the actors present in 
the discourse. The quantitatively lower presence of actors associated with 
the third sector, including especially representatives of environmental NGOs, 
social movements, local associations and groups involved in strategic regional 
development (e.g. local action groups), along with the marginal presence of 
local government politicians, scientists representing research institutions, 
and finally residents, is an evident exclusion mechanism. The communica­
tive public sphere, subject to and in fact limited to the perspectives of the 
worlds of economics and politics, not only excludes widespread deliberation,
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but even restricts debate within symbolic elites. The consequence of this 
is inter-systemic communication (politics-economics] aiming to form a 
favourable environment or political decisions geared towards reproduction 
of power and profit-centred economic actions. This communication is closed 
within the sphere of macropolitics and macroeconomics, and far removed 
from the lifeworld of residents. The buzzwords of public consultations and 
public dialogue are usually no more than a political game either target­
ed at legitimising decisions or used as a political weapon (when political 
opponents are accused of a lack of dialogue or conducting consultations 
improperly].
We found no information or reports in the media on organised dialogue 
meetings. Common, on the other hand, were references to scientific or indus­
try/business conferences on shale gas. There is a lack of materials supporting 
civic participation, and showing how to be included in dialogue and what 
residents have the right to expect. The media make no effort to increase the 
number of actors involved in the discourse or to identify excluded voices 
and standpoints.
Actors representing environmental organisations are presented differ­
ently from business actors or politicians. The main difference is that they 
are less likely to be directly supported by people to whom the media convey 
expert status. They sometimes cite experts’ views, but in this situation they 
play the role of background actors, with positions, views and knowledge 
being attributed to them. NGOs appear more frequently as collective actors 
or together as "environmentalists.” On the radio and television they are 
presented in the field, often in everyday situations and informal dress. Their 
statements are emotional and close to colloquial language. The media often 
contrast them with a clinical, rational expert discourse with politicians and 
business representatives sitting in studios and the experts who support 
them. The latter group are given importance by the formal situation, their 
dress, and academic and professional titles (director, president, expert], 
and the virtue of objectivity is suggested by their theoretical or practical, 
specialist knowledge. Such titles tend not to be used for environmental­
ists and activists (with some exceptions], who are instead described with 
reference to the organisations to which they belong. They are perceived 
from the perspective of their personal engagement, which on the one hand 
makes them more persuasive, but on the other removes their objectivity. 
Although activists are much closer to the everyday world, in the media space 
the imbalance of positions is underlined. The reason for this is probably the 
model of the public sphere attached to the current media discourse -  prior­
itising of elites, hard economic data, legitimation of positions through expert 
knowledge. The partners for journalists organising the discourse are said 
besuited guests sitting in a studio, holding a discussion close to the analyti-
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cal style. Actors who are usually quoted in snapshot reports do not have the 
opportunity for active participation in the discussion, while what they say 
is commented upon by other, privileged actors. The activists shown in the 
field inspire sympathy, but do not convince us of their arguments at the level 
of state policy
A similar mechanism is at play with residents representing local commu­
nities. Here the workings of exclusion mechanisms are demonstrated more 
starkly as they are assigned specific interests, motivations and ignorance. 
These actors function as illustrations of the point of view of the "ordinary 
person,” a construct which is objective in nature -  on the one hand legitimis­
ing the media themselves as representatives of citizens and a public opinion 
forum, and on the other managing the discourse by assigning specific posi­
tions to actors who are actually excluded from it.
A further exclusion mechanism concerns specific arguments. The most 
visible one is attributing the arguments increasing the possible environ­
mental harmfulness to unspecified "opponents,” which sometimes means 
local oppositions and other times the European environmental lobby. Their 
positions are contrasted with the raison d'état of the Polish state, i.e. energy 
independence and economic security. A further argument is placing the 
position of Russia, and specifically Gazprom and its interests threatened by 
shale gas, on the same side of the line.
The next exclusion mechanism is the strategy of overlooking specific 
arguments and a kind of semantic shift entailing treatment of certain issues 
as primary and others as insignificant or marginal. An example might be a 
scene in an interview given by Deputy Prime Minister Janusz Piechociński, 
who, asked about the role of green energy, responded, "As regards Polish 
energy, our main intention is to develop coal...”
Although the Polish media note the opposition of environmentalists to the 
exploitation of shale gas, this is not linked to an extensive discussion on the 
reasons for this protest. They also accentuate the protests over other envi­
ronmental investments, which might lead to the belief that environmentalists 
protest always and about everything.
The media lack any awareness of social dialogue -  which tools it uses, 
what its expectations are linked to and what are or should be its consequenc­
es. The very idea of dialogue appears in the context of the failed investment in 
Żurawłow, which has become an example of incapacity to reach an agreement 
between an investor and the community.
Although the media play an important role as distributors of information 
about what is currently happening with the shale gas project in the public 
sphere, it is hard to observe any intentional actions in favour of broader de­
liberation. Journalists are more likely to adopt the role of observers rather 
than activators of social engagement.
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